Why Wars Are Won in Factories, Not Just on Borders

The Ukraine War and the Industrial Reality Check

When Russian forces entered Ukraine in February 2022, the early commentary focused on battlefield manoeuvres, sanctions, and diplomatic signalling. Less visible, but ultimately more consequential, was the rate at which the war began consuming matériel. Artillery ammunition, drones, armoured vehicles, and spare parts were expended at levels that far exceeded peacetime planning assumptions.

Ukraine’s daily artillery consumption quickly reached several thousand rounds. European militaries discovered that national stockpiles, built for short, high-intensity contingencies, could be depleted in weeks. Production lines that had been downsized or shut down after the Cold War could not be restarted at speed. Tooling had been scrapped, skilled labour had dispersed, and supplier networks no longer existed.

The war revealed an uncomfortable truth: military power in the twenty-first century is constrained not only by strategy and technology, but by industrial depth.

Industrial Capacity as a Geopolitical Variable

For decades, globalisation encouraged the belief that supply chains would remain accessible even during conflict. The Ukraine war demonstrated the fragility of that assumption. Sanctions, export controls, energy disruptions, and transportation bottlenecks turned industrial resilience into a strategic asset.

The United States, often perceived as possessing limitless industrial capacity, entered the conflict producing roughly 14,000 artillery shells per month. Meeting Ukraine’s requirements demanded an increase to more than 80,000 shells monthly, a transition that required emergency funding, political consensus, and over a year of sustained effort. Many European countries lacked even the foundational capacity to attempt similar expansion.

Industrial capacity, once viewed as an economic concern, has become a determinant of geopolitical influence. Countries able to manufacture under constraint gain strategic leverage. Those that cannot become dependent, regardless of battlefield performance.

Lessons from States That Planned for Attrition

History offers consistent examples of how industrial preparation shapes outcomes. During the Second World War, Allied victory was driven not solely by superior tactics but by overwhelming production. The United States produced hundreds of thousands of aircraft and vehicles, turning industrial scale into strategic dominance.

In 1973, Israel’s survival during the Yom Kippur War depended on the ability of domestic factories to surge production within days. More recently, South Korea invested for decades in defence manufacturing capacity to avoid strategic vulnerability, transforming itself from an importer into a major exporter. China’s civil–military integration model reflects a similar recognition that manufacturing scale is inseparable from national power.

These cases differ in political systems and threat environments, yet they share a common logic: defence capability must be sustainable under prolonged stress.

The Limits of Precision and the Return of Mass

The post–Cold War belief that precision weapons would reduce the need for volume has not survived contact with reality. Modern conflicts consume drones as disposable assets, exhaust ammunition stocks at industrial rates, and impose heavy wear on equipment.

Precision has not replaced mass; it has increased dependence on complex supply chains. When those chains are disrupted, even technologically advanced forces face constraints. Attritional warfare, once considered obsolete, has returned as a defining feature of geopolitical competition.

India’s Strategic Moment

India’s security environment is shaped by persistent continental tensions, growing maritime competition, and a global order marked by fragmentation and sanctions. At the same time, India is seeking to transition from a major defence importer to a manufacturing and export power.

This transition cannot be achieved through design capability alone. The decisive question is whether systems can be produced in volume, replenished under pressure, and sustained over long durations without external dependence. That capability resides not in policy announcements, but in factories, supplier ecosystems, and skilled workforces maintained over time.

Industrial preparedness is not a switch that can be activated during crisis. It must exist beforehand, supported by predictable demand and long-term investment.

Factories as Instruments of Endurance

Wars are rarely decided at the moment they begin. They are decided months or years later, when replacement rates, maintenance capacity, and production depth determine endurance. A state that cannot replace losses rapidly loses bargaining power. A state dependent on external suppliers during conflict forfeits strategic autonomy.

Borders define where wars are fought. Factories define how long they can be fought.

As geopolitical competition intensifies and conflicts grow longer and more resource-intensive, the decisive advantage will belong to countries that have preserved and expanded their industrial base. Military strength in the coming decades will be measured not only by platforms and doctrines, but by the quiet, continuous output of production lines that never make headlines.

That is where modern power ultimately resides.

References

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Trends in World Military Expenditure and Arms Production, 2022–2024.
2. NATO Secretary General statements on ammunition stockpiles and industrial capacity, 2022–2023.
3. U.S. Department of Defense. Industrial Base Capabilities Report, 2023.
4. European Defence Agency. Defence Data and Industrial Readiness Review, 2023.
5. Congressional Research Service (US). U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine: Production and Supply Chain Implications, 2023.
6. Freedman, L. Strategy: A History. Oxford University Press.
7. Murray, W., & Millett, A. A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Harvard University Press.